Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

question since 1883; second, there are those creating new procedure, the true semi-legislative authority originally contemplated by the action of parliament, and rules issued for the operation of certain acts of parliament, the duty of drafting the rules being specifically put upon the court by parliament. This is an example of the tendency to put the making of legislative detail into the hands of non-legislative bodies. Third, there are administrative rules concerning the actions of the court and the persons appearing before it.

The volume closes with a discussion of the extension of the practice of letting the courts make their own rules with or without the coöperation of the legal profession, of the county courts and of the various legal systems found in the colonies and India. In these latter the degree of freedom of action granted the courts varies, and regulation by the legislature not infrequently supplements the action taken by the courts.

CHESTER LLOYD JONES.

University of Wisconsin.

Business Competition and the Law. By GILBERT H. MONTAGUE. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1917. Pp. 309.)

This book is written by a lawyer. There is internal evidence that the author has a considerable if not a large practice in advising business men what acts are and what are not illegal under the Sherman act and other similar statutes. He testifies that he is qualified to speak "from a considerable study of the multitudinous court decisions in anti-trust cases." The book, we are told, is written not for lawyers but for business men. The purpose in writing seems to be rather to induce terror than to produce light. At the outset the small business man is warned that he as well as the great combination is marked for slaughter. All are informed that the government is not "letting up" when it comes to a scrutiny of the methods of competition in business. There are hidden terrors in acts which are themselves innocent. There are terrors in mere inaction. The cost of defending a government suit is so great that the smaller business men submit to consent decrees so that business is run not the way the judges say it must be but the way the attorney-general says it shall be. What the government has condemned makes a fresh list of terrors for the business man. Almost everything that is done in the way of business competition may be offensive. Even if a business has patents behind it, it is dangerous to threaten infringement suits, and reliance upon patents to avoid the

anti-trust law is often futile. Joining a trade association is dangerous. Even the now popular device of open competition is not above suspicion.

There would seem to be only one course for the business man to take after he has read this book. He should employ a lawyer who specializes in what is and what is not lawful competition. If, however, Mr. Montague knows no more about the true course to steer than he reveals in his book, there is no reason why the business man should employ him. If Mr. Montague knows more than he has revealed, then the Bar Association might well take up the question of the propriety of conduct of a lawyer-author who seeks only to produce panic when he could give light.

ALBERT M. KALES.

Harvard Law School.

The Man in Court. By FREDERICK DEWITT WELLS. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1917.)

This book initiates the layman into the mysteries of every day (and night) court procedure; admonishes the reformer to blame the law, not its officers; and heartily amuses the trial lawyer. The court, judge, jury, lawyer, witness and client are each depicted as they actually reveal themselves in their wholly human qualities. Nobody is spared, yet no one is treated unkindly. Not so, however, the technique of the law; that, it seems, is "antiquated;" and "looking backward" from the year 1947 we find that "judicial corporations" have swept away the old courts and senseless procedure, and have specialized everything into departments of mid-paradisian efficiency. Judges, lawyers and physicians have merged into "men of business."

To the quasi-trial lawyer, the book's most laugh-fetching paragraph is perhaps that which, in dealing with "elocution" to the jury, reads: "The client watches the (his) lawyer with affectionate admiration. True, he (the lawyer) did not do exactly as he was wanted during the trial. He should have asked those questions he (the client) suggested, but now he is doing splendidly. . . . With such a good talker the jury cannot fail of being convinced."

The author unobtrusively reveals intimate experience with human beings, depth of psychological insight, broad sympathy, healthful humor; a desire for, a belief in, and a capability of bringing nearer, better things to come.

W. S. MCNEILL.

Richmond, Va., Law School.